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Abstract: Philosophers tend to think of themselves as model arguers and that the best kind of 
argument is deductive arguments, i.e., the most persuasive arguments where the premises 
provide the best evidence for conclusions. This raises the question: Do philosophers make the 
best type of arguments? If deductive arguments are indeed the best, and philosophers are model 
arguers, is it the case that philosophers make deductive arguments significantly more than other 
kinds of argument? We set out to investigate this question empirically. Using data mining and 
text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR 
database (n = 435,703). Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (deductive, 
inductive, and abductive), we searched through our corpus to find patterns of usage. Our results 
suggest that deductive arguments were the most common type of argument in philosophy until 
the end of the twentieth century: significantly more common than abductive, but not inductive, 
arguments. Then, around 2008 a shift in methodology occurred, and inductive arguments took 
over as the most common type of argument. In addition, abductive arguments are becoming 
increasingly more popular in philosophy. Overall, our results suggest that deductive arguments 
are giving way to not only inductive arguments but also abductive arguments in philosophical 
practice. 
 
Keywords: abductive argument, deductive argument, indicator words, inductive argument, 
metaphilosophy, philosophical practice 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Professional philosophers, especially academic philosophers working in the analytic tradition, 
tend to think of themselves as model arguers. For example, according to Lacewing (2014, p. 7), 
“At the heart of philosophy is philosophical argument.”1 Similarly, Currie (2016, p. 200) says 
that “philosophers are careful folk, trained in the ways of argument.” In practice, too, 
professional philosophers generally agree that doing philosophy professionally (as opposed to 
amateurishly) means advancing arguments for and/or against philosophical theses. As Verene 
                                               
1 See also Martin (2017), Harrell (2016), and Taylor (1995). 
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(1989, p. 141) puts it, “That philosophy essentially depends on argument is taken as such 
common knowledge that to dispute it seems simply to abandon philosophy for some other form 
of thinking.” Similarly, Bruce and Barbone (2011, p. 1) express the point about the essence of 
academic philosophy being argumentation as follows: “’Show me the argument’ is the battle cry 
for philosophers.” Moreover, the conviction that the heart of academic philosophy is argument 
also plays a role in philosophical argumentation itself. For instance, Cohen (2004, p. 117) argues 
that, “If argument is the heart of philosophy, then metaphor is its life-giving blood.”2 
 
In addition to thinking of themselves as professional arguers, professional philosophers, 
especially academic philosophers working in the analytic tradition, tend to think that the best 
kind of argument is deductive arguments, i.e., the most persuasive arguments where the premises 
provide the best evidence for conclusions. For example, according to Bailey (2013, p. 6), “Good 
deductive arguments are the strongest possible kind of argument.” Similarly, Baggini and Fosl 
(2010, p. 14) write, “Deductive arguments may be thought of as the best kind of sausage 
machines because they guarantee their output.”3 
 
All of this raises the following questions, which are the research questions that will guide 
our empirical study in this paper: 
 
1. Do professional philosophers make the best type of arguments? 
2. If deductive arguments are indeed the best, and professional philosophers are model 
arguers, is it the case that academic philosophers make deductive arguments significantly 
more than other types of argument? 
 
We set out to investigate these questions empirically. Using data mining and text analysis 
methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 
435,703). Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, 
and abductive arguments), we searched through our corpus to find patterns of usage. 
 
Before we report the results of our empirical study in Section 3, we describe our 
methodology in more detail in Section 2. In Section 4, we will discuss how the results of our 
empirical study provide tentative answers to our research questions (1) and (2) above. Overall, 
the results of our empirical study suggest that deductive arguments were the most common type 
of argument in philosophy until the end of the twentieth century: significantly more common 
than abductive arguments, but not inductive arguments. Then, around 2008, a shift in 
methodology occurred, and inductive arguments took over as the most common type of 
                                               
2 In The Chronicle of Higher Education, Oljar and Koukal (2019) write: “philosophy [is] a discipline that has been 
thinking about thinking since its inception. […] Philosophers have spent centuries formulating logical principles that 
distinguish good reasoning from bad reasoning. Knowing the difference between premises and conclusions, factual 
claims and inferential claims, deductive and inductive arguments, and good from fallacious reasoning is vital for 
thinking seriously about thinking.” 
3 In the following passage, Baggini and Southwell (2012, p. 6) seem to suggest that there is a hierarchy of argument 
types, with deductive arguments at the top, followed by inductive arguments, and abductive arguments at the 
bottom: “Here, abduction provided a temporary provisional solution until enough evidence could be gathered for an 
inductive explanation. But when it comes to issues such as whether God exists, or whether other people have minds, 
we may have to rely permanently on arguments to the best explanation. This form of argument is the best kind of 
rational account we can give for a conclusion if it cannot be demonstrated by a deductive argument or if there is 
insufficient evidence to construct an inductive one” (emphasis added). 
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argument. In addition, abductive arguments are becoming increasingly more popular in 
philosophy. Indeed, our results suggest that deductive arguments are giving way to not only 
inductive arguments but also abductive arguments in philosophical practice. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Background 
 
Introductory textbooks to logic and reasoning typically contain a brief discussion of indicator 
words. There are premise indicators—words such as ‘because’ and phrases such as ‘inferred 
from’ and the like—which indicate a premise of an argument, and there are conclusion 
indicators—words such as ‘therefore’ and phrases such as ‘it follows that’ and the like—which 
indicate a conclusion of an argument. For example, Morrow and Weston (2011, p. 5) tell 
students to look for indicator words in order to distinguish between premises and conclusions. 
According to Morrow and Weston (2011, p. 5): 
 
Some words or phrases are conclusion indicators. These are words or phrases that tell 
you that you’re about to read or hear the conclusion of an argument. Other words or 
phrases are premise indicators. These tell you that you’re about to read or hear a premise 
(emphasis in original). 
 
They then provide a list of premise indicators, which includes words like ‘because’ and ‘this 
follows from’, and a list of conclusion indicators, which includes words like ‘therefore’ and 
‘hence’ (Morrow and Weston 2011, p. 5). 
 
In addition to helping students identify premises and conclusions of arguments, indicators 
also help students distinguish between deductive arguments and inductive arguments. For 
example, according to Baronett (2016, p. 23): 
 
to help identify arguments as either deductive or inductive, one thing we can do is look 
for key words or phrases. For example, the words ‘necessarily,’ ‘certainly,’ ‘definitely,’ 
and ’absolutely’ suggest a deductive argument. . . . On the other hand, the words 
‘probably,’ ’likely,’ ‘unlikely,’ ‘improbable,’ ‘plausible,’ and ’implausible’ suggest 
inductive arguments. 
 
Similarly, according to Hurley (2016, p. 31), “inductive indicators” include terms and phrases 
such as ‘probably’, ‘improbable’, ‘plausible’, ‘implausible’, ‘likely’, ‘unlikely’, and ‘reasonable 
to conclude’, whereas “deductive indicators” include terms and phrases such as ‘it necessarily 
follows that’, ‘certainly’, ‘absolutely’, and ‘definitely’. 
 
We can use these deductive indicators and inductive indicators, then, to look for 
deductive arguments and inductive arguments in philosophical texts in much the same way that 
students use them to look for arguments in any text. To the aforementioned deductive and 
inductive indicators, we can also add indicators for abductive arguments, i.e., arguments in 
which the conclusion is supposed to be the best explanation for some phenomenon (Govier 2010, 
pp. 298-302). Abductive indicators include phrases such as ‘account for’, ‘best explain’, ‘make 
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sense of’, and ‘best explanation for’ (Overton 2013). The types of arguments we searched for in 
this empirical study and their associated indicators are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Types of arguments and their indicator words with examples from philosophical texts 
Argument 
Types 
Indicators Examples 
Abductive account for, best 
explain, makes 
sense of, best 
explanation for 
“We infer that middle-sized objects exist, because their 
existence provides the best explanation for the patterns in 
our sense experience” (Trout 1998, p. 97). 
Deductive absolutely, 
certainly, definitely, 
necessarily 
“if, as he says, such an infinite series really is impossible 
then it does absolutely follow that if anything exists in 
time at all, there must have been a moment, before which 
nothing existed” (Moore 1954, p. 175). 
Inductive likely, unlikely, 
probably, 
improbable 
“Whatever may be the case for lesser breeds without the 
law, the nature of ‘open’ and—sotto voce—Western 
societies is such that conspiracy theories involving 
Western governments are unlikely to be true, and hence 
unlikely to be justified” (Pigden 2017, p. 123). 
 
In order to make sure that our indicators for argument types (see Table 1) actually indicate 
arguments in the corpus, we anchored them to argument indicators, such as ‘therefore’ and 
‘hence’. This procedure results in the argument indicator pairs listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Indicator pairs for deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments 
 
Deductive indicator pairs Inductive indicator pairs Abductive indicator pairs 
therefore necessarily therefore probably therefore account for 
therefore certainly therefore likely therefore best explain 
therefore definitely therefore unlikely therefore make sense of 
therefore absolutely therefore improbable therefore best explanation for 
hence necessarily hence probably hence account for 
hence certainly hence likely hence best explain 
hence definitely hence unlikely hence make sense of 
hence absolutely hence improbable hence best explanation for 
so necessarily so probably so account for 
so certainly so likely so best explain 
so definitely so unlikely so make sense of 
so absolutely so improbable so best explanation for 
consequently necessarily consequently probably consequently account for 
consequently certainly consequently likely consequently best explain 
consequently definitely consequently unlikely consequently make sense of 
consequently absolutely consequently improbable consequently best explanation for 
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proves necessarily proves probably proves account for 
proves certainly proves likely proves best explain 
proves definitely proves unlikely proves make sense of 
proves absolutely proves improbable proves best explanation for 
thus necessarily thus probably thus account for 
thus certainly thus likely thus best explain 
thus definitely thus unlikely thus make sense of 
thus absolutely thus improbable thus best explanation for 
follows necessarily follows probably follows account for 
follows certainly follows likely follows best explain 
follows definitely follows unlikely follows make sense of 
follows absolutely follows improbable follows best explanation for 
accordingly necessarily accordingly probably accordingly account for 
accordingly certainly accordingly likely accordingly best explain 
accordingly definitely accordingly unlikely accordingly make sense of 
accordingly absolutely accordingly improbable accordingly best explanation for 
infer necessarily infer probably infer account for 
infer certainly infer likely infer best explain 
infer definitely infer unlikely infer make sense of 
infer absolutely infer improbable infer best explanation for 
 
By searching for these argument indicator pairs (as listed in Table 2) in our corpus, we can find 
out what types of arguments philosophers make in their published works and with what 
frequency. This would help us find answers to research questions (1) and (2) above. 
 
2.2 Text-Mining Methods 
 
A combination of several text-mining packages in R Language were used to manipulate the   
corpus of philosophical texts throughout this study. RStudio was used as an interactive-
development environment to process the data. The corpus of documents included a .txt file 
containing the full-text of the philosophical work, and a corresponding .xml file to the full-text 
file comprised of metadata information about each text file. 
 
The readtext package was utilized to load the text files into the RStudio environment. 
The readtext function takes a folder path as an input parameter (i.e. readtext(“filepath”). The 
readtext() function will then load all files in the target folder into RStudio as a dataframe. The 
dataframe will consist of two columns. 
 
The first column is titled “doc_id,” which lists the file names as individual elements 
within a string vector. The second column is titled “text” and includes the full-text from each of 
the individual text files as single character string. The result is a vector of character strings, with 
each string containing the full-text of an input text file. The .xml files were converted to .txt files 
from the Terminal application and also read into R using the readtext() function. 
 
To search for indicator pairs within the full-text documents, the string_detect() function 
from the stringr package was used in combination with a regular expression as a pattern search 
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parameter. The argument indicator root and anchor were included within the regular expression 
to search for specific words. 
 
The regular expression pattern allowed for the root of the argument indicator pairs to both 
precede and follow the anchor word(s) within a certain range of words, exclusively. The function 
was applied to the corpus across three word-ranges. The ranges selected permitted 3, 6, or 10 
words between the argument indicator root and the anchor word(s). For example, to search for 
pattern matches across a range of 3 words, the regular expression returns a positive match in the 
following cases: 
 
Root word1 word2 word3 Anchor | OR | Anchor word1 word2 word3 Root 
 
Any pattern in which the argument indicator roots and anchors are separated by less than the 
maximum range (i.e., 3, 6, or 10) is also considered a positive match. For example, as applied 
within a 3-word maximum range, the following case would be considered a positive match: 
 
Anchor word1 word2 Root 
 
Applied in this manner, the string_detect() function will return a list of TRUE or FALSE logical 
values, where TRUE indicates the presence of the argument indicator and the anchor at least one 
time within each document and FALSE indicates no pattern match. The logical values were then 
converted to numeric data, with 1 replacing TRUE and 0 replacing FALSE. This detection 
process was repeated for each indicator pair for each of the deductive, inductive, and abductive 
lists and across all three-word ranges. The resulting lists were then summed, and the number of 
positive matches were recorded to a separate .csv file. 
 
Separate .csv files containing matched full-text documents across each of the word-
ranges were also generated from these lists. Publication years were extracted from the metadata 
files (previously .xml files) using the str_extract() function from the stringr package. As with the 
indicator pair matches, a regular expression was used to isolate XML tags containing the 
publication years for each document from the metadata files and paired with the corresponding 
positively matched full-text files. The number of positively matched documents by year in 
proportion to the number of documents in the whole corpus (n = 435,703) was then calculated. A 
regression analysis was then performed on the resulting ratios of positively matched documents 
across each word range. 
 
3. Results 
 
In searches permitting three words between argument indicator root and anchor, the ratio of 
philosophy publications advancing deductive arguments is always higher than those advancing 
abductive arguments and almost always higher than those advancing inductive arguments. With 
regards to the latter, however, the ratios appear to be converging over time, with more recent 
years showing slightly higher ratios of inductive arguments than deductive arguments in 
philosophy publications. 
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An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of deductive 
arguments and the ratios of abductive arguments from the results for searches allowing a 3-word 
maximum range. There was a significant difference between deductive arguments (M = 0.03, SD 
= 0.03) and abductive arguments (M = 0.008, SD = 0.01), t(178) = -9.17, p < 0.00, two-tailed. 
Likewise, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of deductive 
arguments and the ratios of inductive arguments from the results for searches allowing a 3-word 
maximum range. There was no significant difference between deductive arguments (M = 0.03, 
SD = 0.03) and inductive arguments (M = 0.02, SD = 0.03), t(300) = 1.79, p = 0.07, two-tailed. 
These results suggest that philosophers make deductive arguments significantly more than 
abductive argument, but not significantly more than inductive arguments. 
 
We also looked at linear models of the differences in ratios between deductive arguments, 
inductive arguments, and abductive arguments (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Ratios of philosophy publications in the JSTOR corpus with deductive, inductive, and 
abductive arguments permitting three words between argument indicator root and anchor 
 
 
 
When we look at deductive arguments and abductive arguments over the years (1867-
2017), the equation for the line is y = 3.1304x + 0.0123. Given that R2 = 0.91, we can say that 
91% of the variance in deductive arguments is explained by the model, the standard of error of 
the estimate is 0.011. Since p < 0.00, we can conclude that the regression model is a significantly 
good fit. Similarly, when we look at deductive arguments and inductive arguments over the years 
(1867-2017), the equation for the line is y = 0.9682x - 0.0087. Given that R2 = 0.93, we can say 
that 93% of the variance in deductive arguments is explained by the model, the standard of error 
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of the estimate is 0.009. Since p < 0.00, we can conclude that the regression model is a 
significantly good fit. 
 
In searches permitting six words between argument indicator root and anchor, the ratio of 
philosophy publications advancing deductive arguments is always higher than those advancing 
abductive arguments and almost always higher than those advancing inductive arguments. With 
regards to the latter, however, the ratios appear to be converging over time, with more recent 
years showing slightly higher ratios of inductive arguments than deductive arguments in 
philosophy publications. This pattern is similar to the one exhibited by the data from our 3-word 
searches. 
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of deductive 
arguments and the ratios of abductive arguments from the results for searches allowing a 6-word 
maximum range. There was a significant difference between deductive arguments (M = 0.05, SD 
= 0.05) and abductive arguments (M = 0.01, SD = 0.01), t(177) = -9.15, p < 0.00, two-tailed. 
Likewise, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of deductive 
arguments and the ratios of inductive arguments from the results for searches allowing a 6-word 
maximum range. There was no significant difference between deductive arguments (M = 0.05, 
SD = 0.05) and inductive arguments (M = 0.04, SD = 0.05), t(300) = 1.72, p = 0.08, two-tailed. 
These results, which are consistent with the results obtained from our 3-word searches, suggest 
that philosophers make deductive arguments significantly more than abductive argument, but not 
significantly more than inductive arguments. 
 
As we did for our 3-word searches, we also looked at linear models of the differences in 
ratios between deductive arguments, inductive arguments, and abductive arguments (see Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2. Ratios of philosophy publications in the JSTOR corpus with deductive, inductive, and 
abductive arguments permitting six words between argument indicator root and anchor 
 
9 
 
 
 
When we look at deductive arguments and abductive arguments over the years (1867-
2017), the equation for the line is y = 3.1956x - 0.0184. Given that R2 = 0.92, we can say that 
92% of the variance in deductive arguments is explained by the model, the standard of error of 
the estimate is 0.016. Since p < 0.00, we can conclude that the regression model is a significantly 
good fit. Similarly, when we look at deductive arguments and inductive arguments over the years 
(1867-2017), the equation for the line is y = 0.9868x - 0.0124. Given that R2 = 0.95, we can say 
that 95% of the variance in deductive arguments is explained by the model, the standard of error 
of the estimate is 0.012. Since p < 0.00, we can conclude that the regression model is a 
significantly good fit. 
 
Finally, in searches permitting ten words between argument indicator root and anchor, the 
ratio of philosophy publications advancing deductive arguments is always higher than those 
advancing abductive arguments and almost always higher than those advancing inductive 
arguments. With regards to the latter, however, the ratios appear to be converging over time, 
with more recent years showing slightly higher ratios of inductive arguments than deductive 
arguments in philosophy publications. Again, this pattern is similar to the ones exhibited by the 
data from our 3-word and 6-word searches. 
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of deductive 
arguments and the ratios of abductive arguments from the results for searches allowing a 10-
word maximum range. There was a significant difference between deductive arguments (M = 
0.08, SD = 0.08) and abductive arguments (M = 0.01, SD = 0.02), t(178) = -9.16, p < 0.00, two-
tailed. Likewise, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ratios of deductive 
arguments and the ratios of inductive arguments from the results for searches allowing a 10-word 
maximum range. There was no significant difference between deductive arguments (M = 0.08, 
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SD = 0.08) and inductive arguments (M = 0.06, SD = 0.08), t(300) = 1.81, p = 0.07, two-tailed. 
These results, which are consistent with the results obtained from our 3-word and 6-word 
searches, suggest that philosophers make deductive arguments significantly more than abductive 
argument, but not significantly more than inductive arguments. 
 
As we did for our 3-word and 6-word searches, we also looked at linear models of the 
differences in ratios between deductive arguments, inductive arguments, and abductive 
arguments (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Ratios of philosophy publications in the JSTOR corpus with deductive, inductive, and 
abductive arguments permitting ten words between argument indicator root and anchor 
 
 
 
When we look at deductive arguments and abductive arguments over the years (1867-
2017), the equation for the line is y = 3.1796x + 0.0259. Given that R2 = 0.93, we can say that 
93% of the variance in deductive arguments is explained by the model, the standard of error of 
the estimate is 0.021. Since p < 0.00, we can conclude that the regression model is a significantly 
good fit. Similarly, when we look at deductive arguments and inductive arguments over the years 
(1867-2017), the equation for the line is y = 1.0072x + 0.0171. Given that R2 = 0.96, we can say 
that 96% of the variance in deductive arguments is explained by the model, the standard of error 
of the estimate is 0.016. Since p < 0.00, we can conclude that the regression model is a 
significantly good fit. 
 
4. Discussion 
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As discussed in Section 1, our empirical study was designed to address the following questions 
about argumentation in philosophical practice: 
 
1. Do professional philosophers make the best type of arguments? 
2. If deductive arguments are indeed the best, and professional philosophers are model 
arguers, is it the case that academic philosophers make deductive arguments significantly 
more than other types of argument? 
 
The results of our empirical study suggest the following tentative answers to these research 
questions. As far as question (1) is concerned, our results suggest that philosophers do make 
deductive arguments in their published work. Insofar as deductive arguments are considered by 
many philosophers to be the best type of argument (see Section 1 for discussion), we can say that 
philosophers do make the best type of arguments. When it comes to question (2), the results of t-
tests suggest that, on average, philosophers have made significantly more deductive arguments 
than abductive arguments in their published work overall, but not inductive arguments. As we 
have seen, no significant differences were found between the ratios of deductive arguments and 
inductive arguments in our corpus. According to our results, then, it is the case that academic 
philosophers make deductive arguments significantly more than abductive arguments, but it is 
not the case that academic philosophers make deductive arguments significantly more than 
inductive arguments. Since we have observed these patterns in our 3-word, 6-word, and 10-word 
search results, we can be quite confident that these results are robust. 
 
Furthermore, our results also suggest that a methodological change may be taking place 
in philosophical practice. In particular, while deductive arguments were significantly more 
common than abductive arguments and more common (but not significantly so) than inductive 
arguments until the beginning of the twenty-first century, a shift in methodology seems to have 
occurred around 2008, when inductive arguments have taken over as the most common type of 
argument and abductive arguments have started to gain in popularity as well. In other words, our 
results suggest that deductive arguments are gradually giving way to inductive arguments and 
abductive arguments in philosophical practice. This finding is supported by linear models that 
show inductive arguments and abductive arguments significantly accounting for the variation in 
deductive arguments over the years. 
 
In that respect, our findings are in line with the results of other empirical studies on 
argumentation in philosophical practice. In one empirical study, Knobe (2015) compared two 
samples of papers on philosophy of mind: one sample of papers from 1960 to 1999 and another 
sample of papers from 2009 to 2013. Knobe (2015) found that 62% of the papers from the 1960-
1999 sample used purely a priori methods, whereas only 12% of the papers from the 2009-2013 
sample used purely a priori methods. This evidence leads Knobe (2015, p. 38) to conclude that 
there has been “a strong shift [in method] toward the use of systematic empirical data, including 
original experiments conducted by philosophers [i.e., experimental philosophy].” 
 
In another empirical study, Ashton and Mizrahi (2018) test the view that philosophy is 
essentially an a priori discipline empirically. According to Ashton and Mizrahi (2018, p. 62), “if 
philosophy is indeed a priori, and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the 
armchair, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, not inductive, arguments.” 
12 
 
Consistent with the view that philosophy is an a priori discipline, Ashton and Mizrahi (2018) 
find that the proportion of philosophy papers in which deductive arguments are made is higher 
than that of philosophy papers in which inductive arguments are made. However, contrary to the 
view that philosophy is an a priori discipline, Ashton and Mizrahi (2018) also find that the 
proportions of philosophy papers in which deductive arguments are made and those in which 
inductive arguments are made are converging over time and that the difference between the 
ratios of inductive arguments and deductive arguments is declining over time. As Ashton and 
Mizrahi (2018b, pp. 68-69) put it, their results suggest that “deductive arguments are gradually 
losing their status as the dominant form of argumentation in philosophy.” 
 
The interesting thing about our results, which differentiates them from the results 
obtained by Knobe (2015) and those obtained by Ashton and Mizrahi (2018), is that they suggest 
that abductive arguments explain the shift away from deductive arguments almost as much as 
inductive arguments do. In other words, deductive arguments seem to be giving way to not only 
inductive arguments but also abductive arguments in philosophical practice. These patterns were 
observed in our 3-word, 6-word, and 10-word datasets, which is why we can be quite confident 
that these results are robust. Moreover, since our results were obtained from a survey of a large 
corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 435,703), we can be quite 
confident that they are representative of philosophical practice. In that respect, our results 
suggest that we should expect inductive arguments and abductive arguments to become more 
prevalent in philosophical publications at the expense of deductive arguments. 
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